Guest post by Nick Bluhm
Can numbers alone capture the essence of human behavior? This is a question that most anthropology professors would quickly rebuff; yet former General Counsel of General Electric Benjamin Heineman posed this question in a recent article in The Atlantic.
Heineman suggests that in certain situations, an understanding of a community, country, or region requires more than just mathematics or formulas. As an anthroplogist, I agree that these “numbers” are insufficient for understanding human behavior. However, I would go further, and argue that anthropology is a necessary component of any community analysis.
At the heart of all human activity, at the most basic level, is an interaction between two individuals, who have preferences, biases, desires and idiosyncrasies. Anthropology examines these aspects in the collective, carefully developing an understanding of the qualitative, integral components of what drives a culture and a people. By aggregating these individual observations, mostly without the aid of numbers or formulas, anthropologists create a holistic picture, one that I believe is necessary for formulating effective foreign policies.
Tedious? Possibly. Essential? Certainly. Heineman provides an apt case study that highlights the need for qualitative data and field research: Vietnam. Heineman takes aim at former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who clearly failed at forecasting the failure of American troops to surmount the determined North Vietnamese.
McNamara, in his memoir, acknowledges that the failure of Vietnam can be attributed to the “profound ignorance in the history, culture, and politics of the people.” Although the mea culpa came 30 years too late, as an anthroplogist, I find it validating to hear a former U.S. senior official admit to the importance of this knowledge, something that anthropology is ideally suited to provide.
Michael Dove shares Heineman’s sentiment, championing the importance of anthroplogy for a deeper understanding of foreign affairs. In his New York Times article, Dove describes the work of Dr. Ann Soetoro, renowned development anthropologist and mother of current President Barack Obama.
Dove explains that, much like the Pentagon in conducting the Vietnam War, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) lacked the essential perspective gained by Dr. Soetoro during her studies in Indonesia. Dr. Soetoro, who consulted with USAID, attempted to dispel its misguided assumption that the proper village delegate for channeling aid was the village official. Instead, she pioneered the notion of micro-credit, eschewing the USAID approach that she found exacerbated social stratification in the Indonesian villages.
And this is where the two articles agree. In any policymaking or decision-making capacity, there is an urgent need for a dissenting perspective, especially one that captures the spirit, social structure and culture of a community. Anthropologists must continue to challenge the numbers and rigid, formulaic policies heralded as the explanation and objective solution. Anthropology, though often unacknowledged for its contributions, provides an essential toolset for anyone who seeks to thoroughly comprehend the world.
Nick Bluhm is a public policy analyst at the law firm Cooley Godward Kronish, in downtown D.C. He holds an M.A. in anthropology from the George Washington University.
Image: “Lego People.” Source: Joe Shlabotnik.
anthropologyworks 
Qualitative synthesis of key driving factors in any situation is hugely valuable but what is the disadvantage of quantifying behaviour where possible?
With the right skill and perservernece even concepts such as preferences, biases, desires and idiosyncrasies can be captured numerically and analysed. Doing so drives towards greater objectivity and testability of thesis which can only be a good thing. Right?
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Matt,
Thank you for reading AnthropologyWorks, and for your thoughtful response to my post. Let me try to address your question in the context of military intelligence gathering, the topic of a subsequent post of mine on AnthropologyWorks.
For one, I am not making the case against the use of quantitative, statistical data. I am making the case for a balanced approach to data collection and decision-making, especially that which is informed by an approach that anthropology can offer.
Second, my suggestions should not be seen as a shot across the bow of current military thinking; I am not advocating for a tactical change that will undermine the current and worthwhile efforts of our soldiers and intelligence agents. I do not believe that execution and strategy should necessarily be led by anthropologists, nor should leaders necessarily refer to said perspective as anthropological. Rather, I implore the military to understand the challenges and practicalities of empowering the local Afghan population to self-govern. And to do so, I believe that anthropologists could provide valuable and effective assistance.
For some time, armed counterinsurgency has not provided NATO nor the U.S. with significant gains. Talking, diplomacy, policy – all words bandied about by our leaders. Yet without the right kind of intelligence, progress, which is conditional on mutual understanding, will stall. As proof, a current report by American intelligence officers in Afghanistan claims that the U.S. intelligence apparatus “still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.” (Center for New American Security, Fixing Intel, January 2010).
The report acknowledges an important and perennial challenge in broad policy-making hierarchies: maintaining a proper link between the field agents making practical, qualified, and material observations, and the leaders tasked with directing policy and executing strategies. Further, the leaders must have available to them the type of intelligence for making informed decisions about the role of diplomacy, communication, and governance in achieving the long-term objectives of ISAF, the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, the intelligence apparatus could benefit from an anthropological-like perspective, which takes a holistic, qualitative approach to understanding local communities.
Let me construct a generalized analogy: Barack Obama wants to win the State of Texas in the Democratic Primary. As with Afghanistan, winning the hearts and minds of Texan voters will require Obama to have an understanding of the distinct, local culture. And for this effort, Obama will require consultants armed with local knowledge, and not just data gathered from the polls. In order to succeed, Obama will need to make decisions based on an understanding of where to hold the rallies, what communities and demographics are important for the final vote, and who the key community leaders are.
And those consultants are only as valuable as their information gathered through years spent in the community, learning the mores, the important cultural touchstones, and the community’s needs. As with Texas, winning Afghanistan requires first convincing locals of the value of the alternative suggested by the ISAF: good self-governance. And Obama can only do so by having the right kind of information, that which is collected with an anthropology-like approach and can inform his diplomacy and communication.
Therefore, military leaders should take note of those important suggestions by analysts and commentators who have pointed out the pitfalls inherent to both detached, narrowly-focused analyses, and armed counterinsurgency. Anthropology offers a unique perspective that can materially supplement U.S. intelligence and possibly improve the current decision-making.
Nick
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